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A B S T R A C T
Numerous theoretical models and techniques to assess human error were developed since the 60's. Most of these
models were developed for the nuclear, military, and aviation sectors. These methods have the following
weaknesses that limit their use in industry: the lack of analysis of underlying causal cognitive mechanisms, need
of retrospective data for implementation, strong dependence on expert judgment, focus on a particular type of
error, and/or analysis of operator behaviour and decision-making without considering the role of the system in
such decisions. The purpose of the present research is to develop a qualitative prospective methodology that does
not depend exclusively on retrospective information, that does not require expert judgment for implementation
and that allows predicting potential sequences of accidents before they occur. It has been proposed for new (or
existent) small and medium- scale facilities, whose processes are simple. To the best of our knowledge, a
methodology that meets these requirements has not been reported in literature thus far. The methodology
proposed in this study was applied to the methanol storage area of a biodiesel facility. It could predict potential
sequences of accidents, through the analysis of information provided by diﬀerent system devices and the study of
the possible deviations of operators in decision-making. It also enabled the identiﬁcation of the shortcomings in
the human-machine interface and proposed an optimization of the current conﬁguration.
1. Introduction
Human beings play an essential role in the reliability of the en-
gineering systems because they are involved in not only the speciﬁca-
tion, design, implementation, installation, start-up, and maintenance,
but also the operation of these systems. This makes it almost impossible
to design systems in which human error is totally eliminated (Foord and
Gulland, 2006; Baziuk et al., 2016). Therefore, human reliability,
human error, and the tendency to make mistakes are problems of fun-
damental importance.
The accident at the nuclear power plant at the Three Mile Island in
March 1979 (Kemeny, 1979) prompted the mandatory use of the emerging
approach called ‘Human Reliability Assessment’ (HRA). HRA is deﬁned as
‘the probability that a job or a task is satisfactorily completed by an in-
dividual, during a speciﬁc stage of the system operation in a minimal re-
quired time, if that time requirement exists’ (Meister, 1966).
Meanwhile, human error is deﬁned as ‘that action performed by an
individual, which was not intended by the actor; not desired by a set of
rules or an external observer; or that led the task or system outside its
acceptable limits’ (Senders and Moray, 1991). Negligence and
violations are not considered as human errors. Negligence involves
incompetence and carelessness in carrying out the tasks. A violation is a
deliberate (intentional) deviation from safe operating practices, pro-
cedures, standards, or established rules (Reason, 1990).
The beginning of the studies on human error dates back to the late
50s, in the nuclear and military domains. During the 60s, a series of
publications related directly or indirectly to human reliability and error
was published (Meister, 1971). In the same decade, and extending into
the 70s, systems of human error classiﬁcation and even databases of
human error, which were mainly used for the military domain and in
some early developments of nuclear power plants, were developed
(Isaac et al., 2002). During this period, the cognitive approach emerged,
and humans were beginning to be considered as information processors.
It was also found that the functions of solving problems and decision-
making are predominant in abnormal situations, in which human
failure has severe consequences (Amyotte and Khan, 2005). The major
development of HRA techniques occurred in the 80s. In addition, a deep
understanding of human errors, including causes, manifestation, and
consequences, arose (Hollnagel, 2005). In the 90s, some of the HRA
techniques reached maturity, and human error models were expanded
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2017.10.023
Received 31 March 2017; Received in revised form 29 September 2017; Accepted 30 October 2017
⁎ Corresponding author at: Eng. Faculty, Cuyo National University, Centro Universitario, CO M5502JMA, Ciudad, Mendoza, Argentina.
E-mail addresses: rcalvo@cediac.uncu.edu.ar (R.D. Calvo Olivares), srivera@cediac.uncu.edu.ar (S.S. Rivera), jnmcleod@cediac.uncu.edu.ar (J.E. Núñez Mc Leod).
Safety Science 103 (2018) 137–152
0925-7535/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
T
to consider organizational inﬂuences on errors and, more recently, on
maintenance errors and errors associated with automation (Isaac et al.,
2002). Fig. 1 shows a graphical summary of studies on human error and
human reliability over time. Data about accumulated number of Human
Reliability Assessment methods according to year of publication were
extracted from (Hollnagel, 2005, p.160).
Today, as a result of years of research on human error, numerous
theoretical models, taxonomies and techniques have been developed
(Isaac et al., 2002):
1. Taxonomies based on the task: They allow classiﬁcation of human
errors into diﬀerent categories based on the Error Modes (Swain and
Guttmann, 1983; Swain, 1982) or the System (Spurgin et al., 1987).
2. Taxonomies of information processing: They assess human perfor-
mance when trying to localize the ﬂow of information across several
processing stages, from information input to output response
(Broadbent, 1998; Payne and Altman, 1962; Wickens, 1992).
3. Taxonomies and models of symbolic processing: This approach
considers humans and computers as systems of symbolic manip-
ulation for general purposes. Known examples are Rasmussen’s
models such as SKR (Rasmussen, 1981), Multifaceted taxonomy
(Rasmussen, 1982), and Step-ladder model (Rasmussen, 1986);
Murphy diagrams (Pew et al., 1982); the Systematic Human Error
Reduction and Prediction Approach or SHERPA (Embrey, 1986;
Stanton et al., 2005), and Reason’s models as Slips, Lapses, Mistakes
and Violations (Reason, 1990), Actions Not as Planned (Reason,
1979) and the Generic Error-modelling System (Reason, 1987,
1990). Other taxonomies included in this classiﬁcation are those
that categorizes slips of actions (Norman, 1981), the Seven-step
Model of Human Action (Norman, 1986), and the Situation
Awareness Error Taxonomy (Endsley, 1988).
4. HRA techniques for quantiﬁcation of human error: According to Bell
and Holroyd (2009), they are classiﬁed as follows:
– First-generation methods: These methods focused on the rules and
ability levels of human action, and they do not consider the cogni-
tive causes of human error (Baziuk et al., 2016). They are char-
acterized by dividing tasks into their components and then con-
sidering the potential impact of modifying factors such as time
pressure, equipment design and stress. The combination of these
elements allows determining nominal Human Error Probabilities
(HEPs). Examples of this type of techniques are THERP (Swain and
Guttmann, 1983; Swain, 1964), ASEP (Swain, 1987), HEART
(Williams, 1985, 1986, 1988), SPAR-H (Gertman et al., 2005),
HRMS, JHEDI (Kirwan, 1996, 1997), and INTENT (Gertman et al.,
1992).
– Second-generation methods: They are under development and have
not been validated empirically. They focus on human behaviour and
cognitive causes of human error (Baziuk et al., 2016). They in-
corporate the context and commission errors in the prediction of
human error. Examples of these methods are ATHEANA (Cooper
et al., 1996; Forester et al., 2007; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 2000), CREAM (Hollnagel, 1993, 1998), CAHR
(Sträter, 1997, 2000), and MERMOS.
– Third-generation methods: They are based on the ﬁrst-generation
methods and are under development. Example: NARA.
– Expert judgment methodologies: These tools provide structured
methods to the experts to analyse the probability of a human error
in a particular scenario. Although the validity of some of these tools
has been questioned, they continue to be used to determine error
probabilities. Examples of these techniques are APJ (Seaver and
Stillwell, 1983), PC (Kirwan, 1994), and SLIM-MAUD (Embrey,
1983).
Table 1 shows a summary of models, taxonomies and techniques for
human error analysis.
There have also been developed accident analysis models such as
STAMP (Leveson, 2011). STAMP was built on basic Systems Theory and
focuses on inadequate control or enforcement of safety-related con-
straints on the system design, development and operation. Unlike tra-
ditional techniques, it has the ability to view systems as dynamic pro-
cesses with continuous changes in product/process design,
technologies, workforce, etc. (Leveson, 2004). It has been utilized to
analyse multiple post accident, and more hazards and potential failures
in systems have been found (Leveson, 2002; Leveson and Laracy, 2007;
Song, 2012). Recently, the model has been applied to analyse a case of
study in the oil and gas industry (Altabbakh et al., 2014), and to the
Sewol ferry tragedy in order to demonstrate the utility of applying
STAMP model to the maritime transportation domain. In the ﬁrst case,
the model successfully identiﬁed violations against safety constraints
that resulted in the accident. In the second case, some recommenations
were developed for continuous improvements and actions to prevent
future occurrences of such catastrophic accident (Kim et al., 2016).
The use of human reliability assessment techniques allows im-
proving the reliability, availability, and maintainability of any system,
resulting in a better cost-beneﬁt ratio. These enhancements are in-
cluded in diﬀerent stages such as design, detailed engineering, and
operation. This, in turn, facilitates ensuring the safety of the system, the
plant staﬀ, and the environment. However, the aforementioned
methods have some deﬁciencies, which limit their extensive use.
According to Griﬃth and Mahadevan (2011), current HRA methods
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Fig. 1. Timeline of human error and human reliability studies.
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have four main sources of deﬁciencies:
1. Scarcity of empirical data for model development and validation.
2. Lack of inclusion of human cognition.
3. Lack of common parameters between diﬀerent methods (they
heavily rely on the methodology used).
4. Strong dependence on expert judgment in selecting Performance
Shaping Factors (PSFs) and their use to obtain HEP in human re-
liability analysis.
Additionally, in the case of quantitative techniques, the human error
rate is calculated as the combination of diﬀerent values estimated by
subjective expert judgment and by information from accident and in-
cident databases and prescribed probability tables. In other words, a
strong operational database or knowledge of human error is required to
estimate the probability of human error occurrence. This makes it dif-
ﬁcult to apply these methods in most industrial facilities because the
complete databases or knowledge required to implement reliability
assessment techniques are nonexistent or incomplete (Vanderhaegen,
2001). Similar problems arise with some human error models that need
detailed information about accidents or incidents for implementation
(Calvo Olivares et al., 2014, 2015).
However, note that although data about accidents or incidents are
available, the development of a model that only takes into account that
information, limits the scope against potential occurrence of diﬀerent
accidents. According to Leveson (2009), retrospective analysis of ad-
verse events is necessary and is the best way to improve industrial
process safety. However, it is limited by the dynamism of systems and
organizations (Rasmussen, 1997). Technological innovations can
modify certain process conditions or human-machine interface features,
increasing the complexity and understanding by operators. Therefore,
availability of information about past events, while important, is not
suﬃcient to address potential occurrences of accidents and incidents.
Further, because the impact of consequences in the new complex sys-
tems can be very meaningful when an accident occurs not only from an
economical view, but also from a social perspective, it is not possible to
wait until they occur to determine how to prevent their occurrence.
Finally, the little inﬂuence of human reliability approaches upon
many industries, in particular those focused on managerial and orga-
nizational contexts that create latent conditions for failures, is largely
due to the problems of system development not being seriously con-
sidered. According to Johnson (1999), there exist several problems such
as poor methodological support, analyst subjectivity, poor support for
error prediction, focus on accidents and not incidents, individual op-
erator/system focus, and diﬃculty in reaching consensus on the con-
textual sources of latent failures. Unless these problems are addressed,
the theoretical models of cognitive and organizational failure will be of
little practical beneﬁt.
The problems outlined above demonstrate the need to develop a
technique or methodology that not only is of practical use for
Table 1
Summary of models, taxonomies and techniques for human error analysis.
Taxonomies based on the task Error Modes Errors of omission-required action not performed
Errors of commission-required action performed incorrectly
Extraneous acts – wrong or unnecessary acts are performed
System-oriented taxonomy Human actions classiﬁed in terms of the propagation and eﬀects of errors over the course
of an event
Taxonomies of information
processing
Early Information Input, mediation and output errors
Information processing characteristics (perceptual, mediational, communication, motor)
Wicken’s model of information processing Sensory processing (receptors), memory (long-term, working), decision and response
selection, execution
Taxonomies and models of symbolic
processing
SKR Skill-, Ruled- and Knowledge-based behaviour
Rasmusen’s Multifaceted Taxonomy Seven sub-systems of analysis: causes of human malfunction, factors aﬀecting
performance, situation factors, personnel task, mechanisms of human malfunction,
internal human malfunction, external modes of malfunction
Step-Ladder model Eight stages of decision-making: activation, observation, identiﬁcation, interpretation,
evaluation, deﬁning the task, procedure and execution
Murphy diagrams Graphical analysis of error modes. Illustrate underlying causes associated with cognitive
decisión-making tasks
SHERPA (Systematic Human Error
Reduction and Prediction Approach)
SKR external error modes and psychological error mechanisms
Slips, Lapses, Mistakes and Violations Slips: actions-not-as-planned
Lapses: failure in the execution and/or stage of an action sequence
Mistake: intended actions that fail to achieve their intended outcome
Violations: intentional deviation of actions from safe operating procedures
Actions not as planned Five categories of classiﬁcation: discrimination failures; program assembly failures; test
failures; sub-routine failures; and storage failures
GEMS (Generic Error Modelling System) Three basic error types: skill-based slips and lapses, rule-base mistakes and knowledge-
based mistakes
Categorization of Action slips Slips during the formation of an intention
Slips that result from faulty activation of schemas
Slips that result from faulty triggering of active schemas
Seven-step model of Human action Seven stages of mental activity in the control of action at an interface: perception,
interpretation, evaluation, goals, intention, action, speciﬁcation, execution
Situation Awareness Error Taxonomy Three levels of error: L1-fail to perceive or misperception of information; L2-improper
comprehension of information; L3-incorrect projection of information of future actions on
the system
HRA techniques for quantiﬁcation of
human error
First-generation Focus on the rules and ability levels of human action. Do not consider the cognitive causes
of human error. Examples: THERP, ASEP, HEART, SPAR-H, HRMS, JHEDI, INTENT
Second-generation Centered on human behaviour and cognitive causes of human error. Incorporate the
context and commission errors in the prediction of human error. Examples: ATHEANA,
CREAM, CAHR, MERMOS
Third-generation Based on the ﬁrst-generation methods. Under development. Example: NARA
Expert judgment Based on expert opinión to obtain human error probability in a particular scenario.
Examples: APJ, PC, SLIM-MAUD
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industries, but also does not depend exclusively on retrospective in-
formation about accidents and incidents, or expert judgment.
The aim of this work is to provide a qualitative prospective meth-
odology that allows predicting potential sequences of accidents before
they occur, based on objective engineer elements. The methodology
allows identifying the elements from the human-machine interface or
procedures that may divert the operator from the accident sequence
resolution. It includes two general assessment stages: the ﬁrst one
centred on the system to identify the kind of information provided by
the diﬀerent measurement devices; and the second one centred on the
analysis of the operator, evaluating his/her answers according to the
type of information received from the process. These operator’s deci-
sions based on received data can involve human error, diverting him/
her from the accident sequence resolution. The methodology has been
developed for new small and medium-scale facilities whose processes
are simple, but can also be applied for existing plants.
The proposed methodology aims to be prospective in nature, i.e. it
should allow predicting a possible sequence of accident before it occurs.
Etymologically, the word prospective comes from the Latin pro-
spectus that means, ‘to look forward’. The prospective methodology, as
an intellectual discipline, was born in France, initiated by one of its
creators Berger in 1957 (Godet, 1998). Essentially, it allows seeing the
future and making decisions at present. It does not intend to guess the
occurrence of an event, but it looks for signiﬁcantly reducing un-
certainty about its occurrence, showing the actions to be taken in the
present.
There exist several techniques of predictive nature (Baber and
Stanton, 2002; Center for Chemical Process Safety CCPS, 2004; De
Felice et al., 2016; Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002) or of prospective nature
(Funk, 2009; Leveson, 2003, 2004), but none of them has these char-
acteristics or proposes a human error analysis based on the type of
information that the operator gets from the process.
The implementation of the proposed methodology will contribute to
the identiﬁcation of those parts of the system that require substantial
changes in design, operation, and maintenance, in order to avoid
human errors. In particular, process and plant design contribute con-
siderably (50–79%) to accidents occurring in chemical process in-
dustries (Kidam et al., 2015). The proposed technique may contribute
to reducing this percentage by facilitating the identiﬁcation of the
process stages whose design leads to errors by operators and consequent
accidents.
It will also allow modifying working procedures, so that the new
procedures when implemented, properly contribute to reducing the
incidence of human error. Finally, the methodology is a useful tool to
train plant operators to avoid deviations produced because of a deci-
sion-making based on inappropriate information.
2. Materials and methods (theory/calculation)
2.1. General characteristics of the qualitative prospective methodology
The present work proposes a methodology that tries to answer the
following questions:
Which part or elements from the process are critical in terms of
safety or risk?
Which are the events that can initiate an incidental or accidental
sequence?
Which elements of the human-machine interface or procedures
should be observed?
What are their failure modes?
What kind of information do those elements provide?
The answers to these questions will be provided by performing Steps
1–5 (see Fig. 2) of the proposed methodology. They allow determining
the type of information provided by each element or indicator in an
accidental sequence.
Which of these elements, according to the type of information
provided, will deviate the operator from the accident sequence and
in consequence, from the correct problem solution?
The answer to this question will be provided by performing Step 6
(see Fig. 2). It allows explaining possible human error causes, since
according to the information received by the operator, it is the decision
he/she is going to made in order to stop an accident sequence. If this
information is not correct, decisions taken will not stop the accident
sequence.
The general answer to these questions involves two evaluations: The
ﬁrst one centred on the system, analysing the type of information
provided by the diﬀerent plant indicators once the accident has begun,
without considering human intervention; and the second one, focused
Fig. 2. Flow diagram of the qualitative prospective methodology to assess human error.
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on the analysis of the operator, assessing his/her response according to
the type of information received.
The fundamental premise is that the human-machine interface acts
as a ‘mediator’ between the operator and the events occurring in the
plant. However, this mediator does not always provide proper in-
formation, and this leads to operator making mistakes.
It is important to clarify that in this ﬁrst stage of development of the
methodology, only those Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) directly
linked to its conception, and that reduce the performance of the op-
erator, have been considered. That is, human-machine interface and
procedures (which are the elements, whose information the metho-
dology considers that produces the operator's deviation, once an acci-
dental sequence is initiated) in addition to the training and operator
experience (see Section 2.2.1). On the other hand, it seeks to propose a
simple model, easy to implement in the industrial ﬁeld. Because of that,
only main PSF have been considered. According to Leiden et al. (2001),
experience shows that many studies on human error modelling have
failed because they consider too many factors that do not directly
govern the system performance. As a result, models become too com-
plex, diﬃcult to implement, and unproﬁtable. Finally, other PSFs such
as time available, complexity, workload, stress and stressors, environ-
ment, etc. although their importance, its inﬂuence will not be analysed
in this ﬁrst stage of the study. Instead they will be probably in-
corporated in future developments of the quantitative part of the
methodology.
2.2. Description of the analysis methodology
The qualitative prospective methodology to assess human error
developed by authors involves seven stages, as shown in Fig. 2.
All the methodology stages are described in detail in the following
sections.
2.2.1. Gathering information related to the process facility
The ﬁrst stage involves collecting information related to the general
process of the plant. At this stage, a deep understanding of the following
points is needed:
• Plant functioning, especially, thermodynamic and hydraulic opera-
tions (when applicable), to obtain information about the stages and
sequences of the processes performed and to gain indications about
the state of the variables that govern them, based on which the
operators make decisions.
• Procedures, instructional material, and operational practices be-
cause they are the formal and informal guides used by operators. In
the last case, personnel interviews are useful to determine ways of
performing procedures because in the situation prevailing in the
industrial sector, the way of implementing procedures does not al-
ways match what is written.
• Operator instruction and training, and training programs (if any),
because they provide an idea about how operators perform tasks.
• Current supervision tasks, whether they are appropriate, and whe-
ther they are suﬃcient;
• Plant design, providing details about the human-machine interface,
because an improper design can aﬀect operator performance. Piping
and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) diagrams are useful at this
stage.
In the case of industrial installations that have been in operation for
several years and that have suﬃcient operative experience, the in-
cident, accident, and shutdowns history, the delays in corrective
maintenance orders, etc. can be considered as supporting information,
because they provide data about recent problems, diﬃculties, experi-
ences, and deviations that aﬀected operator performance. It is also
useful to consult equipment suppliers to identify early failures or mal-
functioning of equipment provided to other industries of the sector.
Also, the changes introduced by technological improvements or
innovations will result in changes in the processes or in the human-
machine interface. According to (Leveson, 2009) the introduction of a
new technology, may cause new potential causal factors. Because of this
reason, any technological change should be taken into account in the
analysis.
For new installations, even those that are in the design stage, in-
formation about accidents and incidents that occurred at similar plants
can be collected. However, these data are not determinant for the im-
plementation of the methodology owing to the prospective nature of the
methodology and because the development of this methodology does
not depend on retrospective information exclusively. This information
is a possible element of support because the original premise is the
proposal of a methodology to predict a sequence before it occurs. In
conclusion, the methodology is independent of the existence of histor-
ical information, but if it exists, such information acts as an element of
support.
To carry out this stage, an engineer with knowledge about human
factors (accredited by speciﬁc training in the issue of human reliability,
human error and human factors) accompanied by one or more technical
experts as required according to the plant size and complexity. The ﬁrst
one brings together the knowledge associated with human factors, pro-
cedures or HMI, and understanding of operator decision-making. The
second ones, provide the technical information about the process.
2.2.2. Deﬁnition of the scope of analysis
Based on the data gathered in the ﬁrst stage, the starting point-
initiating event- and the sequence of subsequent events that can lead to
an accident must be identiﬁed. At this stage it is necessary to determine
those processes or sub-processes from which an initiating event can
take place and which, therefore, are critical for the complete system
(plant). This means that every involved equipment failure or human
error associated with such a failure may start accident sequences with
severe or signiﬁcant consequences not only for plant staﬀ, but also for
its environment. For example, the methanol or ethanol storage areas of
a biofuels facility or the secondary feedwater system in a nuclear power
plant. In the ﬁrst case, the spilling or release of methanol or ethanol,
either liquid or gaseous, inside a poorly ventilated area or near ignition
sources may lead to an explosion or a ﬁre. In the second example, lack
of adequate control of feedwater from the secondary circuit may con-
tribute to the reactor core uncovery.
Two well-known methodologies used for scenario analysis can be
implemented for this goal: Event tree and Fault tree analysis.
Event tree analysis is an analysis technique for identifying and
evaluating the sequence of events in a potential accident scenario fol-
lowing an initiating event. It uses a graphical structure called event tree
that shows multiple outcomes and outcome probabilities. This tool al-
lows analysing complex systems with components continuously oper-
ating or in standby mode. In an event tree, the starting point- initiating
event- disrupts normal system operation, and that display the sub-
sequent sequences of events involving success and/or failure of its
components. The event tree headings are, in general, arranged in
chronological order (i.e. in the same order the events are expected to
occur) or causal order (i.e. events are rearranged so that the number of
omitted branch points is maximized).
Fault tree analysis is a structured approach used to determine the
root causes and probability of occurrence of an undesired event in a
complex system. It allows to model graphically the possible combina-
tions of malfunction and wrong actions that can cause an undesired
event (accident or incident) to occur. The graphical model is organized
by the logic of Boolean algebra and its symbols (AND- and OR-gates).
The analysis is deductive because it develops the logical paths from the
general problem-the single undesired event at the top- to the speciﬁc
causes-all the possible root causes at the bottom. The advantages of this
method are: it can be easily performed and understood, it provides a
useful overview of the system, and shows all of the possible causes for a
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problem under investigation (Ericson, 2005; Nivolianitou et al., 2004).
Additional information and development and application of these
techniques can be found in literature (DeLong, 1970; Ericson, 2005;
Federal Aviation Administration, 2000; Larsen, 1974).
It is important to clarify that both techniques are going to be used in
order to identify the initiating event and the sequence of subsequent
events that can lead to an accident. Quantiﬁcation of probabilities is not
involved in the present study.
Continuing with the examples presented at the beginning, a possible
undesired event associated with methanol storage is the increasing of
the tank level and its consequent spill. This can create an explosive
atmosphere if ignition sources are present in the vicinity. With regard to
the secondary feedwater system, an undesired event is the loss of
feedwater either by a malfunction of the system pumps (both main and
auxiliary) or by the blocking of valves that failed to open or were closed
(human error), restricting the movement of the coolant from the aux-
iliary secondary circuit in case of failure of the main secondary circuit.
2.2.3. Description of the human-machine interface
For every critical sub-process or sequence under analysis, all the
elements that are indicators of intervening variables (temperature,
pressure, ﬂow, and level) and allow controlling the process, should be
identiﬁed and described. These elements may be of analogical, digital,
or sound type. To ensure that all the involved indicators are taken into
account, the order in which they are located can be followed, or the
part of the sub-process involved as their sequence is followed can be
determined.
Considering an indicator involves not only the sensor located in any
part of the process, the transmitter, and the indicator (light, alarm, etc.)
in the control room, but also sensors with no transmitters, for which,
the operator must check the status of the variables in situ.
In this stage, plant system models such as engineering diagrams or
P&ID are useful.
2.2.4. Determination of the failure modes of an indicator
In this stage, the failure modes for all the elements identiﬁed in the
previous steps are determined by a Failure Modes and Eﬀect Analysis
(FMEA). According to literature (Ericson, 2005; Stamatis, 2003), the
FMEA is a speciﬁc methodology that assesses a system, a design, a
process, or service to identify the possible ways in which failures of
diﬀerent system components can occur. For this purpose, analysts de-
velop lists of components with their potential failure modes and try to
determine the eﬀects of these modes on the system (Papadopoulus
et al., 2004). The following table shows one of the models used for such
studies. The table incorporates the column named ‘local eﬀect’ in order
to facilitate failure detection by operator. When a component has more
than one failure mode, more rows, as necessary, are added.
In this particular case, the technique is used to identify the modes in
which every identiﬁed indicator can fail. For example, a pressure switch
may fail because of an error of excess or a defect, or may not indicate
measurement; a relay can fail because of closed contact, open contact,
coil wear, or short circuit.
The aim of this analysis is to generate the necessary data that allow
classifying the information provided by every indicator into the fol-
lowing categories: ambiguous, inaccurate, or nonexistent (indicator
does not display measurement lectures). FMEA will also allow identi-
ﬁcation of the failure modes causes, the local eﬀect (detection mode),
and the eﬀect that has over the general system.
It is important to emphasize that the analysis made in this stage is
useful to initiate information classiﬁcation. However, there are some
examples of industrial reality in which the type of provided information
by indicators is not at all related to the failure modes. Additionally,
information provided by one or more indicators in a system can be also
incomplete, or can be a situation that is not covered by an FMEA. All of
these cases will be explained in detail in the following sections.
2.2.5. Classiﬁcation of the information provided by each indicator
The information provided by each element is classiﬁed into four
categories:
. Erroneous
. Ambiguous
. Nonexistent
. Incomplete
Categories 1, 2, and 3 arise from FMEA. Incompleteness (category 4)
was added because it has been found that in certain accident sequences,
for example, in the TMI-2 accident (Kemeny, 1979), if additional ele-
ments had been available to check the displayed information and de-
termine the real state of variables under analysis, operative decisions
probably would have been diﬀerent from those taken. When talking
about additional elements, reference is made not only to measurement
devices, but also to the deﬁned procedures or standards for certain
variables.
The four categories will be deﬁned with examples as follows.
2.2.5.1. Erroneous information. Following the meaning of the term, an
indicator is said to display erroneous information when it is inaccurate
or wrong. This deﬁnition involves the following situations:
a. Recorded values are not the actual values because of a failure of the
indicator. This fact can be veriﬁed by FMEA. Failures can occur
because of the constructive features of the measurement and
transmission elements, or because of their use under conditions for
which they were not constructed. For example, thermocouples are
devices to measure temperature; however, if they are used at tem-
peratures higher than 1373 K (Rempe and Knudson, 2014), the ac-
curacy of the readings decreases, and the measured values do not
match the actual conditions.
b. Recorded values are not the actual values, without any failure
during functioning. These cases cannot be determined through an
FMEA, but it is necessary to consider them because they are part of
the industrial reality. For example, consider the level gauge in one of
the TMI reactor’s vapour generators. The pressure transmitter was
incorrectly installed, and as a result, it recorded erroneously low
values when the generator was steaming (Rempe and Knudson,
2014). Another example is the use of a mass ﬂow meter in a pipe in
which normally a liquid is circulated. This device uses liquid density
for ﬂow calculation, which, in turn, is calculated based on the
temperature. If there is a sudden increase in temperature, the liquid
turns into steam, and meter readings will be erroneous because the
meter will be still considering liquid density and not steam density.
In both cases, it can be veriﬁed that erroneous readings are not due
to the inadequate internal functioning of the device.
2.2.5.2. Ambiguous information. The information provided by an
indicator is ambiguous when it does not show what is truly
happening to the state of the variable or element under control (e.g.
valve). The following examples are considered as ambiguous:
a. Sensor goes out of range: Either at the end, or at the beginning of it.
In this case, the operator cannot know if the readings of the variable
are higher or lower than that indicated by the instrument.
b. When the indicator shows a state or situation that is not the actual
state or situation occurring in the process. The following examples
correspond to incidents some of them with adverse consequences.
These incidents occurred because the operator received ambiguous
information.
b.1 In the nuclear power plant Crystal River unit 3 (Forester et al.,
2007), during reactor start up, a pressure transitory of the cooling
system occurred. This was followed by an increase in power.
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Because of this increase, the pressurizer spray valve opened to
control a slight increase in pressure. The spray valve actuator
failed, and left valve opened partially. However, the lights in-
dicating valve position showed that it was closed. The pressure of
the reactor cooling system started to drop, and as a result, op-
erators failed to identify the cause. Clearly, it can be veriﬁed that
an ambiguity existed in the case of the light indicator because it
did not indicate the actual valve position.
b.2 In this example, the thermometer (because of its localization)
did not indicate the operator reactor temperature, but showed the
temperature of a nearby pump. This led to an explosion (Kletz,
1998). A glycerine stream entered a reactor and circulated
through a heat exchanger that could work to cool as well as to
heat the substance. At the beginning of the process, the heat ex-
changer was used to heat glycerine, and when the temperature
reached 388 K, addition of ethylene oxide to the reactor initiated
an exothermic chemical reaction. Once the reaction occurred, the
heat exchanger was used to cool the product. Fig. 3 shows a
simpliﬁed diagram of the plant identifying not only the ambig-
uous information, but also the incomplete information.
The pump that supplied ethylene oxide could not be turned on
unless the circulation pump was working; the temperature was
over 388 K because ethylene oxide would not react otherwise; or
temperature was under 398 K, to avoid the reaction proceeding
too quickly. Despite these precautions, an explosion occurred
because of the ambiguity of the information received by the
process operator. The plant was in operation; ethylene oxide was
added, and the reactor pressure increased. The last data indicated
that ethylene oxide was not reacting. The operator decided that
the temperature reading value was low or that more heat was
necessary to initiate the reaction, so he set a conﬁguration and
allowed the temperature to increase to 473 K. Pressure continued
to rise. Suspecting an error in his theory, he checked the valve
position in the reactor base. He found that it was closed, so he
decided to open it. Three tons of unreacted ethylene oxide and
glycerine went through the heat exchanger (working as a heater)
and catalyser, causing a violent and uncontrolled reaction that
culminated in reactor explosion and gas escape. The operator
noted from the temperature indicator that the temperature had
increased; however, the temperature of the reactor content had
not increased. The circulation pump was working, but the valve in
the suction line was closed, warming up the pump, and this heat
aﬀected the temperature sensor because of its proximity to the
pump.
In this case, there was clearly an ambiguity without a failure in
the measurement device because the operator understood that the
sensor displayed the temperature of the reactor when it actually
displayed that of the pump. The operator could have turned to the
observation of other indicators of temperature throughout the
process to gain a better understanding of the situation; however,
ambiguous information caused a deviation, making the operator
focus only on this information.
c. When diﬀerent devices are located in an area, they measure the
same variable at diﬀerent points, and adequate identiﬁcation is
lacking. That is, it is not known certainly, if the measurements came
from one or other device. For example, during TMI accident, the
strip-chart prints from radiation measurement monitors inside the
reactor building were ambiguous because operators did not know if
the registered data corresponded to one monitor or the other
(Rempe and Knudson, 2014).
Fig. 3. Process diagram of the chemical plant. (Adapted from Kletz, 1998).
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2.2.5.3. Nonexistent information. This occurs when the indicator does
not record data either because of a fault (identiﬁed by FMEA), or
because the element has been disconnected or turned oﬀ. The last
situation may be as consequence of repairing or maintenance tasks,
after which the various devices do not return to their normal or
operative position. In other cases, the data storing capacity of the
equipment being used may not be adequate for an accidental event
because it is not possible to store complete information. For example,
consider the accident sequence at TMI: information about system
alarms was lost because the printer that recorded information from
diﬀerent indicators was turned oﬀ during a certain time. This happened
because the printer capacity and memory system could not process
large amounts of data.
2.2.5.4. Incomplete information. The indicator provides incomplete
information when additional data are not available, for instance,
about other process measurement variables, procedures, or
instructions from the supervisor that allow deﬁning the state of the
system correctly. In other words, it involves not only the lack of
contrast information that allow checking the real state of a variable, but
also the lack of procedures or instructions indicating what certain
conditions or process variables mean, and how to make decisions
according to them. Considering again the example of the ethylene oxide
process, information was incomplete because the lack of a ﬂow meter in
the pump suction tapping did not allow the operator to detect the
closed valve and to know the fact that there was no circulation from the
reactor to the heat exchanger. Even this knowledge would have warned
him that the glycerine had not reached the indicated temperature for
the reaction to occur. On the other side, other elements such as the level
indicator and the alarm that indicated a low ﬂow were out of operation.
2.2.6. Analysis of operator decision according to received information
This stage involves the analysis of possible decisions that an op-
erator can make based on the received information, taking into account
the sub-process or critical task sequences and the initial event de-
termined in previous stages. Therefore, once the sequence has begun,
the manner in which it could continue, if the operator makes decisions
based on erroneous, ambiguous, or incomplete information, or if there
is no information on which the operator can base his/her decisions, is
determined.
According to the type of information previously deﬁned, two ana-
lyses are possible:
1. The operator receives erroneous or ambiguous information: He/she
tries to solve the problem based on the error or the ambiguity:
• The corresponding procedure according to the information received
is implemented. However, because the information is erroneous or
ambiguous, the procedure that the operator thinks is correct is in-
appropriate for the system, and its implementation may result in
aggravating the accident sequence or a deviation from its resolution.
• The operator does not do anything.
2. The operator receives incomplete information or does not receive
data:
• Operator notices the fact: He/she looks for additional information
for decision making (previous experience in similar situations or
problems, consultations to the supervisor, on manuals and proce-
dures). This information may or may not exist.
→ The appropriate resolution procedure is applied.
→ Inappropriate or incomplete procedure is applied (commission,
omission error)
• Operator does not realize about the event:
→ The corresponding procedure according to the information re-
ceived is implemented. However, because the information is in-
complete or nonexistent, it is understood the procedure that op-
erator thinks is correct, though it is not really appropriate for the
system, and its implementation may result in aggravating the
accident sequence or a deviation from its resolution.
→ The operator does not do anything.
According to the examples presented in the stage Classiﬁcation of the
information provided by each indicator, the following points are noted:
– In the nuclear power plant, owing to the ambiguity, operators did
not identify the cause of decrease in pressure.
– In the chemical plant, once the accident sequence had begun, be-
cause of the ambiguity, the operator did not realize that the ade-
quate temperature to initiate the reaction had not been reached in
the reactor. However, by observing the indicator and the valve po-
sition, the operator applied the procedure that he/she believed was
appropriate, and opened the afore-mentioned valve. Further, be-
cause of incomplete information, the operator did not quickly rea-
lize that the valve connecting the reactor and the circulation pump
was closed, and that there was no ﬂuid ﬂow from the reactor to the
pump. Therefore, the operator did not notice in time that the valve
was closed, and in consequence, it remained in the wrong position.
Note that in the presented examples, past events were analysed to
deﬁne the type of information and its characteristics. However, the
technique is prospective in nature, and its aim is to identify which part
of a sub-process, task sequence or information can be erroneous, am-
biguous, incomplete, or nonexistent, and to assess the possible decisions
of the operator based on it, once the accident event is initiated.
The methodology proposes that the cause of human error and the
consequent deviation from the resolution of the accident sequence are
associated with the type of information that the operator receives. Thus,
the commission error occurred, not because the operator decided to
apply the procedure that he/she thought correct, but because the in-
formation received might not have been appropriate in all cases.
2.2.7. Proposal of enhancements
According to the type of information identiﬁed and the possible
operator behaviours, modiﬁcations that should be implemented are
proposed. These involve design, structural, or layout changes; in-
corporation of new procedures or upgrading of existing ones; in-
corporation of supervision and improvement of operator training and
expertise; or incorporation of training programs that consider the
analysed situations as potential accident scenarios.
For the examples analysed in Section 2.2.5, the following im-
provements may be recommended:
• Perform programmed maintenance of diﬀerent system devices to
avoid failures.
• Check that the system in which devices are installed meets the re-
commended conditions for their use.
• Supervise installation procedures of measurement devices so that
they are installed correctly, following the manufacturer’s instruc-
tions, and make the corresponding adjustments according to the
process.
• Avoid setting the measuring ranges of sensors only for normal op-
erating conditions, and use their operating limits, or install sensors
with ranges covering the unanticipated conditions of an accident.
• Ensure that the equipment to process and store information has
enough capacity for data backup and proper operation during
emergencies.
• Depending on the type of variable being measured, avoid installing
the measurement devices at locations close to other devices that
may inﬂuence it and modify its measurements. In the chemical
plant, for instance, the temperature should have been measured in
the reactor or as close as possible to it.
• Through corrective maintenance, ensure that all the process control
devices work properly.
• In the operator training, include the reading review sequence of the
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diﬀerent devices needed for proper diagnosis of the process state.
• Ensure proper identiﬁcation of human-machine interface elements,
and check, when applicable, the existence of adequate correspon-
dence with respective devices in the control panel.
• In the process, add all the nonexistent elements, whose absence may
cause the operator to receive incomplete information. In the che-
mical plant, the installation of a ﬂow meter was recommended.
2.3. Advantages and disadvantages of the methodology
Next, the advantages and disadvantages of the methodology are
detailed.
Advantages:
– Easy to implement
– Since the methodology has been developed for medium- and small-
scale installations with simple processes, an engineer trained in
human factors is suﬃcient to carry out the analysis. (The fact of
involving a specialist, makes the analysis costly and, in con-
sequence, these types of installations do not perform analysis about
human error, human reliability or human factor). However, if the
installation, beyond its size, has a high complexity in its processes, it
will be necessary to hire a specialist in human factors to perform the
analysis.
– Does not depend exclusively on retrospective information. When the
methodology is going to be used for new installations, the lack of
information is not an impediment for its implementation. If previous
data exist, it could be used as support element.
– Allows identifying potential error sequences once the accident event
has begun.
– Does not involve expert judgment.
– Is applicable to any technological system, regardless of its com-
plexity and innovation, because it relies on the analysis of in-
formation provided by diﬀerent elements of the human-machine
interface; that is, the methodology can be extended to other in-
dustrial domains.
Disadvantages:
– As the number of elements to be evaluated increases, the analysis
may require a considerable amount of time.
– Does not address completely the dynamic nature of actual opera-
tions. Many processes may be happening simultaneously in the plant
and indicators may change continuously. This is not reﬂected by the
methodology.
3. Application of the proposed methodology
The application of the proposed methodology to a medium-capacity
biodiesel plant is discussed in the following sections. The plant has an
automated system consisting of sensors, controllers, and actuators for
measuring and controlling the variables of interest.
3.1. Gathering information related to the process facility
3.1.1. Operative performance
The installation produces biodiesel by transesteriﬁcation of vege-
table oil. Methanol and sodium hydroxide are used as raw materials.
The operation equipment consists of batch reactors, pumps, centrifuges,
and distillation columns. Additional equipment includes decanters,
heaters, and storing tanks (Van Gerpen et al., 2004).
Biodiesel is obtained by a homogeneous catalysis reaction by using
methanol as the alcohol and a basic catalyst (sodium hydroxide). The
alcohol and catalyst are mixed in advance and then combined with the
oil in the reactor. The mixture is stirred for approximately 1 h at 333 K
in a stirred tank reactor (CSTR) in order to achieve a product stream
composition identical to the composition inside the reactor. Once the
chemical reaction occurs, methyl-esters and glycerine are obtained.
They are separated through a decanter. The methyl-esters are carried on
to the neutralization step in which the residual catalyst is neutralized by
the addition of an acid, and the soap that may have formed during the
reaction is separated. The soap reacts with the acid to form soluble salts
and free fatty acids. Thereafter, by washing with water, all traces of
residual catalyst, soap, salts, free methanol, and glycerine are removed.
Methanol is removed earlier through vacuum distillation. After the
washing step, residual water is removed from biodiesel by drying. The
glycerine stream only contains 50% glycerine, excess methanol, and
most of the catalyst and soap. Glycerine is reﬁned by adding acid to
separate the soaps into salts and free fatty acids. Then, methanol is
removed by evaporation.
The methanol obtained from methyl-esters and glycerine streams
tends to collect all the water entering the process, and this water must
be removed in a distillation column before the methanol re-enters the
process (Van Gerpen, 2005).
3.1.2. Control devices
For continuous processes, control variables involve temperature,
pressure, level, and ﬂow.
The temperature at a speciﬁc point is measured using a thermo-
couple. It is an electrical device, consisting of two metal conductors
bonded by welding or torsion. When this junction is heated, a voltage in
the order of millivolts is set between the wires. This voltage is pro-
portional to the junction temperature. The metals used in the junction
and their diﬀerent combinations are appropriate for the diﬀerent tem-
perature ranges that characterize these devices. A thermocouple is
usually enclosed in a pod in order to obtain a correct reading.
Thermocouples may be used to monitor and to control the process.
When process temperature is to be measured, one end of the thermo-
couple should be in contact with the process (hot junction) and the
other with a constant temperature (cold or reference junction). A
transmitter is needed to convert the voltage to a standard 4–20mA
current (CNSC Technical Training Group, 2003; Van Gerpen et al.,
2004).
Pressure is measured by means of strain gauges. A strain gauge is a
device that measures the external force (pressure) applied to a thin
wire, which is generally in the form of a mesh. A pressure change causes
a change in the resistance because of the distortion of the wire; thus, the
pressure value is obtained by measuring the change in resistance of the
metal mesh. This change in resistance is used as the resistance variable
in a bridge circuit that provides an electrical signal for displaying the
pressure value (CNSC Technical Training Group, 2003; US Department
of Energy—US DOE, n.d.; Van Gerpen et al., 2004). Such sensors have a
temperature-compensating meter to compensate the heat produced by
the current ﬂowing through the wire.
The level measure is obtained using diﬀerential pressure gauges that
measure the diﬀerence in pressure between two pressure connectors
located in a container. Level measures depend on liquid density, and
hence, any change in density can aﬀect readings. Measurement and
control of the level in a vessel generally require two points of reference
within the vessel. Level measurements can be converted to electrical
signals and used for control.
Flow is measured using diﬀerential pressure ﬂow meters that can be
used for monitoring and control. These elements measure the diﬀerence
in pressure between the two sides of a restriction in a conﬁned ﬂuid
stream. This restriction can be imposed by diﬀerent kind of devices such
as Venturi or Pitot tubes, oriﬁce plates or ﬂow nozzles (CNSC Technical
Training Group, 2003; US Department of Energy—US DOE, n.d.; Van
Gerpen et al., 2004). In such systems, the ﬂow reading is a signal
proportional to the diﬀerential pressure; however, this relationship is
not linear: the diﬀerential pressure increases according to the square of
the ﬂow, or in other words, the ﬂow is proportional to the square root of
the diﬀerential pressure. To convert the signal of the ﬂow transmitter,
the square root must be extracted by an electronic (or pneumatic) de-
vice to obtain a linear ﬂow signal in the 4–20mA range.
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3.1.3. Procedures
• Lack of operative procedures or standard instructions, mainly in
medium- and small-scale installations. This leads to the use of in-
appropriate mixtures to carry out chemical reactions or to the er-
roneous setting of control variables as temperature and pressure.
• Scarcity or lack of maintenance procedures for outsourced personnel
to warn the personnel about existing risks at the site of work (Calvo
Olivares et al., 2014).
3.1.4. Operator training and qualiﬁcation
• Lack of training and understanding of the process and its possible
deviations
• Inadequate supervision
• Lack of awareness about the health risks involved in handling of
certain chemicals, such as methanol, sodium hydroxide, and sul-
phuric acid
• Performance of tasks without personnel protection equipment
3.2. Deﬁnition of the scope of analysis
According to failure tree analysis, an initiating event is an increase
of the level in the methanol tank, in the methanol storage area of the
plant. The analysis may focus on this initiating event to determine a
possible sequence of adverse events that leads to an accident.
The analysis will be applied to a critical sub-process: methanol
storage. The importance of this sub-process lies in the fact that this
chemical substance may cause ﬁres owing to its ﬂammability and may
seriously aﬀects the health of the operators (Alliance Consulting
International, 2008).
3.3. Description of the human-machine interface
A simpliﬁed schema of the storing methanol area was considered for
implementing the methodology (see Fig. 4).
The storage tank is ﬁlled by a one-step centrifugal pump and has a
level gauge that acts also as a controller. When the tank level reaches
the necessary level for the next step of the process (transesteriﬁcation
reaction), as detected by the level control, a signal is sent to the pump
to stop it automatically. If the pump does not stop functioning, the
operator can notice a high level in the tank in situ through the visual
level indicator and can stop the pump by using the control panel button
to switch it oﬀ or manually. If the pump does not stop, the level may
increase until it reaches the oriﬁce through which methanol reaches a
buried tank that contains it safely via a pipe. A block valve is located on
the pipe, located between the tanks. The position of this valve can be
checked in the control panel through a light indicator. The block valve
can be opened or closed manually. If the oriﬁce is clogged or in the
event of an accidental closing of the block valve, methanol does not
reach the buried tank, and the level in the storing tank will continue to
rise until it reaches the venting, leading to an unwanted spill.
From the above description, the following human-machine interface
elements can be identiﬁed:
A. Level controller
B. Actuator for automatic pump shutdown
C. Visual level indicator
D. Block valve light indicator (incorporated into the valve command
system)
3.4. Determination of the failure modes of an indicator
For the elements identiﬁed in the previous step, FMEA was con-
ducted using the model introduced in Table 2. The results of the ana-
lysis are presented in Table 3. Diﬀerent failure modes were obtained
from various references (CNSC Technical Training Group, 2003;
Panchangam and Naikan, 2013; U.S. Department of Energy, 1992a,
1992b).
3.5. Classiﬁcation of the information provided by each indicator
A. Level Controller:
1 Erroneous: Not applicable.
2 Ambiguous: When the sensor goes out of scale, and readings are
inaccurate, it is not possible to know certainly if the level is higher
(or lower) than the reading.
3 There is no information: When there is no element actuation be-
cause of problems in the electronic circuits, the level readings are
not registered, and therefore, the stop signal (or start) may not be
sent to the pump.
4 Incomplete: Not applicable.
B. Actuator for automatic pump shutdown: It is not possible to implement
information classiﬁcation in this case, because it is an actuator that
stops functioning correctly when some of the analysed failure modes
occur, but it does not display the information to the operator. The
operator will only realize that the pump has not stopped (and
therefore, failed) upon checking the level in the tank.
C. Visual level indicator
1 Erroneous: Not applicable.
2 Ambiguous: Not applicable.
3 There is no information: Not applicable.
4 Incomplete: Nonexistence of an alarm in the control room that
alerts the operator if the tank level has reached the value estab-
lished as safe, in order to avoid spills. Another alternative could
be using a diﬀerential pressure transmitter that allows measuring
and verifying the level in the control room.
D. Block valve light indicator
1 Erroneous: Not applicable.
2 Ambiguous: If the valve is stuck in the closed position, and the
light indicator in the control room is oﬀ because of a failure (for
example, it is burned out) the information will be ambiguous for
the operator because according to the indicator, the valve is
opened when it is actually closed.
3 There is no information: Not applicable.
4 Incomplete: Lack of a ﬂow meter downstream the valve that al-
lows verifying if methanol is circulating to the containment vessel.
3.6. Analysis of operator decision according to received information
For the actual analysis, a possible scene is proposed according to the
gathered information.
In the second stage, it was proposed that an initial event of an in-
cident sequence could be an increase in the methanol tank level that if
uncontrolled, could end in a spill.
Thereafter, the possible operational decisions based on the type of
information provided by the interface elements were studied.
Furthermore, a series of unfavourable, but likely assumptions was
made.
First, the block valve that allowed circulation to the containment
tank was assumed to be left closed after a maintenance task to the
containment vessel to avoid leakages. In such installations, according to
the analysis made in the ﬁrst stage, supervision tasks are limited or
virtually nil, and most of the maintenance tasks are performed by
outsourced personnel. Hence, it might be possible that the valves were
not set into their normal position, that is, open position.
Initially, the necessary quantity of methanol is transferred to the
storage tank, and this methanol is to be then transferred to the mixing
reactor, in which the methoxide solution is prepared for oil transes-
teriﬁcation. According to the analysis of information, the level con-
troller may fail, or the connection between the controller and the pump
that prevents the pump from stopping may fail. Further, the pump may
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undergo a failure to stop; that is, the pump receives the order to stop,
but it does not stop. In either situation, the consequence will be an
increase in the level of the tank.
Operator analysis No. 1:
When the tank level increases, the visual level indicator is analysed.
In stage ﬁve, it was found that the information provided by this element
is incomplete. In this case, two possibilities exist:
1. The operator notices the situation:
→From the visual level indicator, the operator detects that the level
is increasing and applies the corresponding procedure to stop the
pump manually. Result: The incidental sequence is stopped, and
there is no spill.
→ From the visual level indicator, the operator detects that the level
is increasing and applies an inappropriate or incomplete procedure
and the pump does not stop working. Result: The level continues to
increase over the reference level.
2. The operator does not notice the situation
3. Owing to lack of attention, or because the operator is performing
another activity, he/she does not observe the visual level indicator
and does not stop the pump. Consequently, the level inside the tank
continues to rise. In this case, the incompleteness of the information
(nonexistence of an alarm in situ or in the control room that warns
the operator about the increase in level) diverts the operator from
resolving the problem. Result: The level continues to increase over
the reference level.
The methanol level continues to increase until it reaches the connection
oriﬁce with the pipe that allows it to ﬂow the containment vessel.
Operator analysis No. 2:
The analysis of the visual level indicator continues.
1. The operator notices the fact:
1.1. In a later visual checking of the level, the operator notices that
the actual level is over the reference level, and stops the pump
manually. Result: The incident sequence is stopped, and there is
no spill.
1.2. In a later visual checking of the level, the operator notices that
the actual level is over the reference level, but as the operator
knows that the methanol will be transferred to the containment
tank, he/she may decide to not stop the pump. However, as an
immediate step, the operator should check the block valve light
indicator. Result: The incident sequence does not stop, and the
tank level continues to increase.
2. The operator does not notice the situation
3. The operator does nothing. Result: The incident sequence does not
stop, and the tank level continues to rise.
Operator analysis No. 3:
Next, the block valve light indicator is analysed. In a previous study,
it was found that the type of information provided by this indicator was
ambiguous (in the control room, the indicator displays an opened valve
when the valve was actually closed because of a failure or human error)
and incomplete (no ﬂow meter was available downstream to verify
methanol circulation through the pipe to the containment tank).
If the information is ambiguous, the operator may take the fol-
lowing actions:
1. Apply the procedure that he/she understands is appropriate ac-
cording to the received information.
2. Do nothing because the light indicator shows that the valve is
opened.
In either case, methanol will spill.
Additionally, the information is incomplete. The operator may take
the following actions:
1. The operator notices the fact:
→The operator can look for additional monitoring data, for ex-
ample, regarding the valve in situ and checking if it is opened or
closed. If the operator notices that the valve is closed, he/she opens
it, or shuts the pump to stop the ﬂow of methanol. Result: The
methanol ﬂows into the containment vessel, or the ﬂow of methanol
Fig. 4. Simpliﬁed scheme of the methanol storage sub-process.
Table 2
Model list used for FMEA.
Item Component Function Failure
Mode
Failure
Cause
Local Eﬀect
(Detection
Mode)
Eﬀect on
the
system
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to the tank is stopped, and there is no spill.
→ The operator can look for additional monitoring data but applies
an inappropriate or incomplete procedure. The pump does not stop
working and the valve is not opened. Result: there is a spill.
2. The operator does not notice the situation: Owing to incompleteness
(no additional information is available for decision-making); any
procedure may be applied. Result: With the pump functioning,
transferring methanol to the tank, and the block valve closed, the
level in the tank increases, causing a spill in the facility.
A summary of operator decisions according to received information
is shown in Table 4.
4. Results of the application of the methodology
4.1. Potential accident sequences according to operator’s decision
Based on the study of operator’s decisions, 18 potential decision
sequences were identiﬁed:
1. Level of the tank increases→Operator notices the situation→
Applies correct procedure→No methanol spill.
2. Level of the tank increases→Operator notices the situation→
Applies an incorrect procedure→ Level of the tank reaches the
oriﬁce→Operator notices the situation→ Applies correct proce-
dure→No methanol spill.
3. Level of the tank increases→Operator notices the situation→
Applies an incorrect procedure→ Level of the tank reaches the
oriﬁce→Operator notices the situation→Applies incorrect proce-
dure (does not turn the pump oﬀ) → Checking of the block valve
light indicator→Operator applies the procedure he/she under-
stands is appropriate→Methanol spill.
4. Level of the tank increases→Operator notices the situation→
Applies an incorrect procedure→ Level of the tank reaches the
oriﬁce→Operator notices the situation→Applies incorrect proce-
dure (does not turn the pump oﬀ) → Checking of the block valve
light indicator→Operator does nothing→Methanol spill.
5. Level of the tank increases→Operator does not notice the situa-
tion→Operator does nothing→ Level of the tank reaches the or-
iﬁce→Operator notices the situation→Applies correct proce-
dure→No methanol spill.
6. Level of the tank increases→Operator does not notice the situa-
tion→Operator does nothing→ Level of the tank reaches the or-
iﬁce→Operator notices the situation→ Applies an incorrect pro-
cedure→ Checking of the block valve light indicator→Operator
applies the procedure he/she understands is appropriate→
Methanol spill.
7. Level of the tank increases→Operator does not notice the situa-
tion→Operator does nothing→ Level of the tank reaches the or-
iﬁce→Operator notices the situation→ Applies an incorrect pro-
cedure→ Checking of the block valve light indicator→Operator
does nothing→Methanol spill.
8. Level of the tank increases→Operator does not notice the situa-
tion→Operator does nothing→ Level of the tank reaches the or-
iﬁce→Operator does not notice the situation→Operator does
nothing→ Checking of the block valve light indicator→Operator
applies the procedure he/she understands is appropriate→
Methanol spill.
9. Level of the tank increases→Operator does not notice the situa-
tion→Operator does nothing→ Level of the tank reaches the or-
iﬁce→Operator does not notice the situation→Operator does
nothing→ Checking of the block valve light indicator→Operator
does nothing→Methanol spill.
10. Level of the tank increases→Operator notices the situation→
Applies an incorrect procedure→ Level of the tank reaches the
oriﬁce→Operator notices the situation→Applies incorrectTa
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procedure (does not turn the pump oﬀ) → Checking of the block
valve light indicator→Operator notices the situation→ Applies the
correct procedure→No methanol spill.
11. Level of the tank increases→Operator notices the situation→
Applies an incorrect procedure→ Level of the tank reaches the
oriﬁce→Operator notices the situation→Applies incorrect proce-
dure (does not turn the pump oﬀ) → Checking of the block valve
light indicator→Operator notices the situation→ Applies an in-
correct procedure→Methanol spill.
12. Level of the tank increases→Operator notices the situation→
Applies an incorrect procedure→ Level of the tank reaches the
oriﬁce→Operator notices the situation→Applies incorrect proce-
dure (does not turn the pump oﬀ) → Checking of the block valve
light indicator→Operator does not notice the situation→Operator
does nothing→Methanol spill.
13. Level of the tank increases→Operator does not notice the situa-
tion→Operator does nothing→ Level of the tank reaches the or-
iﬁce→Operator notices the situation→Applies an incorrect pro-
cedure→ Checking of the block valve light indicator→Operator
notices the situation→Applies the correct procedure→No me-
thanol spill.
14. Level of the tank increases→Operator does not notice the situa-
tion→Operator does nothing→ Level of the tank reaches the or-
iﬁce→Operator notices the situation→Applies an incorrect pro-
cedure→ Checking of the block valve light indicator→Operator
notices the situation→ Applies an incorrect procedure→Methanol
spill.
15. Level of the tank increases→Operator does not notice the situa-
tion→Operator does nothing→ Level of the tank reaches the or-
iﬁce→Operator notices the situation→Applies an incorrect pro-
cedure→ Checking of the block valve light indicator→Operator
does not notice the situation→Operator does nothing→Methanol
spill.
16. Level of the tank increases→Operator does not notice the situa-
tion→Operator does nothing→ Level of the tank reaches the or-
iﬁce→Operator does not notice the situation→Operator does
nothing→ Checking of the block valve light indicator→Operator
notices the situation→Applies the correct procedure→No me-
thanol spill.
17. Level of the tank increases→Operator does not notice the situa-
tion→Operator does nothing→ Level of the tank reaches the or-
iﬁce→Operator does not notice the situation→Operator does
nothing→ Checking of the block valve light indicator→Operator
notices the situation→ Applies an incorrect procedure→Methanol
spill.
18. Level of the tank increases→Operator does not notice the situa-
tion→Operator does nothing→ Level of the tank reaches the or-
iﬁce→Operator does not notice the situation→Operator does
nothing→ Checking of the block valve light indicator→Operator
does not notice the situation→Operator does nothing→Methanol
spill.
Six of these eighteen sequences are successful, and there is no me-
thanol spill, while the other twelve may lead to a methanol spill. In six
of the potential failure sequences, the incompleteness of the informa-
tion provided by the indicators causes the operator to deviate from
making a decision to resolve the incident. In the other six failure se-
quences, the incompleteness and ambiguity of the information provided
by the indicator has a similar eﬀect.
If the area where the spill occurs is not properly ventilated or if
there are ignition sources nearby, the spill may lead to an explosion and
ﬁre with serious consequences for the personnel, installations, and
surroundings.
The identiﬁcation of potential sequences also allows explaining the
causes of human error in each case and helps take decisions to make the
necessary changes to avoid such error. According to the American
Institute of Chemical Engineers (2004), in critical or emergency situa-
tions, it is necessary to manage all the aspects that play a great role in
human performance under stress; for instance, it is necessary toopti-
mize aspects of control panel design as ‘grouping of information’ and
‘overview of critical parameters’ in order to avoid cognitive tunnel vi-
sion. The analysis of information provided by diﬀerent measurement
devices and the study of the possible deviations of the operator in
making a decision enables the identiﬁcation of the shortcomings in the
human-machine interface elements, and thus, allows us to propose an
optimization of their current conﬁguration.
4.2. Proposal of enhancements
In order to avoid the incident sequences previously described, the
following enhancements are proposed:
• Incorporate an alarm to indicate that the level in the tank is higher
than the desired level (check or reference point).
• Implement the concept of redundancy by placing a second controller
to stop the pump in case of failure of the ﬁrst controller.
• If the time interval between the increase in the level beyond the
desired level, and the moment at which the level reaches the oriﬁce
is known, an operator round can be scheduled in that time interval.
• Place a ﬂow meter downstream the block valve to detect any ﬂow.
• Instruct the operator that if a level increment is detected, the safest
option is to stop the pump, regardless of the presence of the con-
tainment tank. Instructions should be documented in a procedure
and incorporated into operator training.
• Incorporate supervision tasks in order to ensure that once the
maintenance tasks are concluded, all instruments and equipment are
returned to their normal or functioning positions.
• Eliminate all ignition sources near methanol storage areas, and en-
sure proper ventilation of the storage area.
5. Discussion
The methodology was implemented for a biodiesel plant, con-
sidering a possible initiating event in the methanol storage area. It has
served to give answer all the questions raised at ection 2.1 of the article:
– It identiﬁes all the elements of the human-machine interface and
procedures that, according to information provided may aﬀect op-
erator’s decisions.
– It allows ﬁnding the potential accidental sequences based on pos-
sible operator decisions: eighteen potential accident sequences were
found. Twelve of these sequences would have culminated in a me-
thanol spill accident.
– It allows verifying the way in which the type of information received
by the operator can inﬂuence his/her decision and lead him/her to
make a human error. For example, owing to an ambiguity, the op-
erator believes that the valve is opened, when it is actually closed,
and he/she does nothing to stop methanol circulation.
The proposed methodology uses an engineer complementary tool,
FMEA, to identify those elements of the system that may not provide
data or may provide erroneous or ambiguous information. FMEA is a
broadly developed technique and is used in the industrial ﬁeld.
According to the present work, FMEA analysis allows determining the
kind of information provided by the diﬀerent indicators in the methanol
storage area of a biodiesel plant.
The last step of the methodology focuses on a series of re-
commendations based on the analysis results, that is, the diﬀerent ac-
cident sequences; the objective of the recommendations is to avoid
potential occurrences. These recommendations can involve design
changes, modiﬁcations of the operation and maintenance procedures,
operator training, improvement or adding of supervisory tasks, etc. The
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basic idea is to modify or improve all the elements in the process that
can cause the operator to deviate from resolving the accident sequence.
It is important to highlight that proposed recommendations are
engineering solutions to the problem and that positively improve the
situation of the plant. They are an ‘intermediate’ solution and feasible
to start solving the problem. They may be perfectible or susceptible of
improvement but are clearly a step in improving the installation si-
tuation. According to the complexity and involved risks of the in-
stallation, later analysis related to Human Factors may be required (e.g.
study of alarm philosophy, common cause failures, the convenience of
using digital or analogue instruments, the kind of supervision and
veriﬁcation tasks, etc.). A Human Factors person should be involved in
this analysis to ensure adequate consideration of Human Factors aspects
of the potential accident sequences, and to ensure that any improve-
ment recommendations developed do not create new/hidden human
error possibilities.
6. Conclusions
This paper presents a qualitative prospective methodology for
analysing human error. Incorporating the concept of prospective does
not mean ‘divination’ of the occurrence of an event, but rather looks for
reducing the uncertainty about its occurrence. In this sense, the pro-
posed analysis technique allows identifying possible accident scenarios
that can arise as a result of decision-making based on erroneous, am-
biguous, incomplete, or nonexistent information. This classiﬁcation is
not based on expert judgment, but on the study of the diﬀerent con-
ﬁgurations and designs of human-machine interfaces in a plant. It is
important to emphasize that retrospective information can be a sup-
porting element to the proposed accident analysis methodology.
However, it does not determine its implementation.
This new approach tries to provide answers to the problems raised
at the beginning by eliminating the subjectivity of the analyst, sup-
porting the prediction of accidents, and focusing on the human-system
interaction in an integrated manner. It is also a practically applicable
methodology for the industry: it provides an answer for those plants or
installations that have no implemented human reliability approaches,
since speciﬁc and costly resources and techniques are required. At this
ﬁrst stage, it has been designed for small or medium-scale facilities,
whose processes involved are simple, such as biodiesel production.
The technique was applied to an area at a biodiesel plant. However,
its use can be extended to other installations or part of them with au-
tomated human-machine interfaces, provided that levels of complexity
are similar to those studied. For installations or plants of higher com-
plexity (e.g. chemical and petrochemical industries, reﬁneries, and
nuclear power plants) the adequacy of the methodology should be
further studied.
In principle, the methodology proposes to analyse all elements
identiﬁed in an accidental sequence. However, when the number of
elements is such as to hinder or make the analysis more complex, a way
of choosing those elements that, because of the information provided,
causes human errors involving a high risk to the system, must be de-
termined. Future work is necessary in order to determine the way of
doing this analysis and improve the methodology.
Finally, the methodology, in this ﬁrst development, utilizes some
traditional accident analysis techniques that rely on a chain-of-event
paradigm of causation (Qureshi, 2007), and deal with systems and the
environment as a static design and unchanging structure (Leveson et al.,
2003). Further work is needed to improve the proposed methodology in
this sense.
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